An axiomatic foundation for additive utility representations on simplex domains, applied to preferences over probability distributions.
Research
Microeconomic theory, including decision theory, information economics, and dynamic games, with applications to FinTech.
Publications
Publications
A weakening of separability that retains tractable structure while admitting richer interaction across choice dimensions.
Working Papers
Working Papers
Should credit registries disclose borrowers’ application histories? We study this question in embedded finance, where lenders observe different slices of borrower activity and borrowers choose where to apply first. A prior rejection may then reflect borrower–lender mismatch rather than low quality, and disclosing it can make the better-matched lender reject after a favorable signal, destroying a second opinion. The welfare effect reduces to one statistic: the repayment quality of the rejected borrowers who would receive a favorable second opinion. When it lies between the social and private lending cutoffs, disclosure blocks loans with positive expected social surplus but negative lender profit, and full concealment is optimal. Under common screening the same statistic can fall on the opposite side of the cutoffs, reversing the policy ranking in either direction: disclosure policy should depend on why a rejection occurred, not only whether it occurred.
Work in Progress
Work in Progress
Distribution drift interacts with selective labeling in credit scoring to break myopic-optimal screening, producing cyclical model degradation and an exploration trade-off.